CAIN-42 PROTO-VAGI · INFRASTRUCTURE GOVERNOR OF AGI CAIN-42 Proto-VAGI is the infrastructure governor of AGI and a VAGI research platform. It is not yet AGI; its intelligence results are early and bounded. AGI dossier → Proof factory → Auditor index → E100 organism → E99 recurrent → VAGI suite → E95 harness →
CAIN-42 PROTO-VAGI CAIN-42 Proto-VAGI is the infrastructure governor of AGI. CAIN-42 Proto-VAGI: early, measured signs of intelligence, and every action it takes comes with a signed receipt. Auditor index: every VAGI bundle, verifier re-runs, manifest hashes →
Early, measured signs of intelligence
  • E95: on a frozen held-out set, composing procedures it had not seen went from 0/90 to 79/90 after one harness improvement (two candidates rejected). evidence (Constructed tasks; a configuration change, not a weight update.)
  • E93: open procedure synthesis solved 369/510 held-out tasks versus 200 for selecting from a supplied library. evidence (At equal compute the two were about equal (208 vs 200).)
  • E105: it learned from its own experience where hidden preconditions sit (33.0% of its learned lift on the column holding 10% of cells), with no code that knows the answer. evidence (Learned, not yet useful: steering with it did not raise success (24 vs 27 of 100).)
  • E75: on held-out unfamiliar code repairs it solved 8/8, where the previous version solved 0/8. evidence (Narrow single-function repair; frontier tasks 1/4; the local model alone 1/8.)
  • E79: model-backed agents answered 35/104 tasks vs 10/104 for the deterministic baseline (about 3.5x). evidence (One 0.5B model; collaboration gave no significant gain; host address redacted (disclosed).)
Every action comes with a signed receipt
  • 12 CAIN-42 VAGI Agents live: 35/35 published signed records verify offline with a verifier that imports no CAIN code. evidence (Deterministic rule engines; nothing executed on real systems.)
  • Authorization boundary: 27/27 adversarial cases pass, 0 unauthorized effects; kill switch: 0 effects after the KILL order. evidence (Loopback on one host, not the production MCPGate.)
  • E110 (in progress): hardened execution boundary passes 22/22 attack cases (the E102 boundary: 19); independent emergency KILL/REVOKE path; 0 effects after KILL in a 40-step race. Six-hour governed mission running. evidence (Interim; loopback, one host; no gate claimed PASS yet.)

Proto means early. CAIN-42 is governed AGI infrastructure; it is not yet AGI. The intelligence results are on constructed tasks, measured by the same project and not independently reproduced. Also on record: negative results (E103, E104, E106) in the proof factory.

NEW · CAIN-42 VAGI AGENTS Governed vertical agents for 12 industries: 12 of 12 live Open the agents →

Each CAIN-42 VAGI Agent proposes the work for your case, decides every action — ALLOW, HOLD FOR HUMAN or DENY — under published rules, and returns a signed, hash-chained record you can re-check offline. Other agents ask for a click; these agents give you proof.

LIVE 2027 PICK
Insurability Evidence Agent
Evidence for insuring AI agents · use it →
LIVE 2027 PICK
Underwriting & Claims Agent
Carriers & MGAs: underwriting and claims · use it →
LIVE 2027 PICK
Adviser Communications Agent
Investment-adviser (RIA) compliance · use it →
LIVE
Insurance Agency Agent
Insurance agencies · use it →
LIVE
Injury Intake & Demand Agent
Personal-injury law · use it →
LIVE
Prior Authorization Agent
Healthcare prior authorization and billing · use it →
LIVE
Month-End Close Agent
Accounting close · use it →
LIVE
Loan File Agent
Mortgage origination · use it →
LIVE
Collections Agent
Debt collections · use it →
LIVE
Leasing Agent
Property leasing · use it →
LIVE
Freight Booking Agent
Freight brokerage · use it →
LIVE
Benefits Intake Agent
Public-sector benefits · use it →

Verify the claims: evidence bundle (signed samples, rule sets, tests) · offline verifier · signing key · live API · auditor index (all VAGI evidence)

CAIN-42 is governed AGI infrastructure. It is not yet AGI; its intelligence results are early and bounded. The agents are deterministic rule engines; nothing is executed on real systems; prices are proposals; no customers, audit or certification are claimed for them.

AGI INFRASTRUCTURE EVIDENCE CAIN decides, the resource enforces, every effect is recorded — measured, with limits. All infrastructure evidence →
Authorization boundary (CAIN decides, resource enforces)
27/27 adversarial cases pass; 0 unauthorized effects (forged, replayed, expired, mismatched permits; revocation; scope escalation; partition fails closed)
Limit: Loopback, three OS processes on one host; not the production MCPGate (cain/mcp_proxy).
Kill switch during an active mission
0 effects after the KILL order in the resource's own hash-chained ledger; mission refused with KILL_SWITCH_ENGAGED
Limit: Same host; the first run used a looser counter and was replaced by the ledger-order check (disclosed).
Byzantine worker, independent verifier
30 false success claims, all rejected; 0 honest claims rejected; only verified experience enters shared memory
Limit: The verifier replays deterministic worlds; one Byzantine worker of four.
Consensus cluster (PBFT, n = 3f + 1)
proof 2483 at 2026-11-19T12:53:08Z: cluster cain-mr-01, agreement True, 3 signing, health MINIMUM_QUORUM
Limit: Vendor-operated validators in one admin domain; safety incident 2026-11-15 (conflicting certificates on cain-mr-02, quarantined) and view incident 2026-11-18 on mr-03.
Public anchoring of daily evidence
daily evidence root recorded in Sigstore's public Rekor log; standalone verifier published
Limit: Anchors integrity of the record, not the truth of its contents; 0 independent witness cosignatures.
Persistent governed mission (6 h)
0.5545 h, 1343/1541 episodes, 1 process starts, finished False
Limit: One host; every action through the loopback boundary; forced kill and resume at the halfway mark.
Earlier infrastructure bundle (E86)
governed intelligence foundation bundle (2026-11-17)
Limit: Its source-code folder was withdrawn on 2026-11-17 (source stays private); see its WITHDRAWN notes.
ALL EVIDENCE 328 evidence bundles · 19,665 files · 287/287 signed-claim pins match Open the full registry → catalog generated 2026-11-19T12:50:37Z
Newest:soak-multiregion-48h-2026-11-18tlogintegrity-monitorhourly-proof-mr03vagi-audit-index-2026-11-19vagi-desks-2026-11-19e79-collective-intelligence-2026-11-15e75-cognitive-generalization-2026-11-14hourly-proofe91-eval-2026-11-18e93-vagi-evidence-2026-11-18vagi-suite-2026-11-18
Product & engine evidence (234)
_publisher
acp-evolution03-state-2026-10-05
agentic-75-paradigm-2026-11-13
agentic-75-products-2026-11-12
agentic-75-try-it-2026-11-12
agi-control-boundary-2026-10-06
agi-experiments-2026-10-06
agi-infrastructure-research-lab-2026-11-19
agi-live-campaign-2026-10-06
agi-live-campaign-latest
agi-live-run-2026-10-06
apex-autonomy-2026-10-08
aplusplusplus-2026-09-29
argus-prompt14-2026-10-12
atlas-prompt15-2026-10-12
authority-mesh-2026-10-08
bench-2026-09-26
bft-ip-forensics-2026-10-05
bft-multiprocess-2026-09-21
boundary-hardening-2026-10-06
cag-l5-hosted-governor-2026-09-28
cain-mr03-view184-2026-11-18
cain-product-service-audit-2026-11-15
cain37-evidence-fabric
cain38-economic-fabric
cain39-agent-internet-fabric
cain40-agent-organization-fabric
cain41-universal-proof-network
cain42-agent-proof-package-2026-09-24
cain42-convergence-fabric
cain42-orchestration-fabric
cain42-proof-package-2026-09-24
cain45-zod-live-2026-09-27
capabilities-32-2026-10-03
catalog-go-live-2026-10-03
causality-2026-10-08
conformance-run-2026-10-04
continuum-authority-2026-10-11
convergence-prompt24-2026-10-08
crucible-2026-10-08
dataplane-evolution-2026-09-29
decision-signing-2026-09-27
degraded-network-2026-09-27
degraded-network-948b189-2026-09-27
dynasty-prompt12-2026-10-11
e10-collective-governance-2026-09-28
e100-integrated-organism-2026-11-19
e102-persistent-organism-2026-11-19
e103-transfer-and-skills-2026-11-19
e104-precondition-discovery-2026-11-19
e105-precondition-location-2026-11-19
e107-organism-experiments-2026-11-19
e11-governance-proof-2026-10-05
e11-intent-governance-2026-09-28
e12-perception-evidence-2026-09-28
e12-trust-network-state-2026-10-05
e13-bpf-governance-execution-2026-10-05
e14-capability-governance-2026-09-28
e15-spatial-physical-intelligence-2026-09-28
e16-causal-world-intelligence-2026-09-28
e16-causal-world-intelligence-2026-09-29-r2
e17-multi-agent-world-action-2026-09-28
e18-4d-spatial-autonomy-2026-09-28
e19-governed-autonomy-2026-09-28
e20-agentic-institutions-2026-09-29
e20-governed-autonomous-substrate-2026-10-04
e21-open-ended-intelligence-2026-09-29
e22-governed-cognitive-runtime-2026-09-29
e23-continuous-assurance-2026-10-05
e23-governed-meta-intelligence-2026-09-29
e24-frontier20-sovereign-intelligence-2026-10-04
e24-governed-agentic-internet-2026-09-29
e25-governed-autonomous-control-2026-10-04
e25-universal-machine-agency-2026-09-30
e26-completion-2026-10-04
e26-universal-machine-agency-trust-2026-09-30
e27-agentic-internet-control-plane-2026-09-30
e27-catcp-control-2026-10-05
e28-catcp-ip-commercial-2026-10-05
e28-portable-execution-identity-2026-09-30
e29-machine-transaction-fabric-2026-09-30
e30-governance-network-2026-10-05
e30-governed-machine-autonomy-2026-09-30
e31-governance-proof-fabric-2026-10-05
e31-universal-proof-of-governance-2026-09-30
e32-global-trust-settlement-2026-10-05
e32-governed-autonomy-learning-2026-09-30
e33-governed-agentic-operating-fabric-2026-09-30
e34-proof-carrying-machine-agency-2026-09-30
e35-governance-intelligence-2026-09-30
e36-machine-agency-exchange-2026-09-30
e37-autonomous-execution-mesh-2026-09-30
e37-e38-hosted-lab-2026-10-05
e38-mission-decision-path-2026-10-06
e38-proof-carrying-machine-agency-2026-09-30
e39-governed-agent-factory-2026-09-30
e40-autonomous-enterprise-intelligence-2026-09-30
e41-machine-agency-exchange-2026-09-30
e42-frontier-fleet-forensic-2026-10-03
e42-supreme-governed-agentic-infrastructure-2026-10-01
e6-live-lease-2026-09-28
e7-bench-2026-09-28
e7-e8-predictive-kernel-2026-09-28
e7-lease-2026-09-28
e7-replay-2026-09-28
e7-seccomp-2026-09-28
e7-uncertainty-horizon-live-2026-10-06
e72-2026-11-14
e75-cognitive-generalization-2026-11-14
e79-collective-intelligence-2026-11-15
e8-governance-2026-09-28
e8-hosted-commit-2026-10-01
e85-frontier-2026-11-17
e85-governor-vertical-agi-2026-11-17
e85-vertical-intelligence-2026-11-17
e86-agi-infrastructure-2026-11-17
e89-intelligence-validation-2026-11-17
e9-agent-passport-2026-09-28
e91-eval-2026-11-18
e91-vertical-intelligence-2026-11-18
e92-procedure-synthesis-2026-11-18
e93-interim-2026-11-18
e93-vagi-evidence-2026-11-18
e95-recursive-intelligence-2026-11-18
e98-intelligence-2026-11-18
e99-latent-generalist-2026-11-19
epicenter-2026-10-08
etcd-coordination-2026-10-15
evolution-1-frontier-contract-fabric-2026-10-04
evolution-10-governance-attestation-2026-10-04
evolution-14-sovereign-launchpad
evolution-15-governed-agentic-runtime
evolution-16-durable-mission-runtime
evolution-2-frontier-contract-enforcement-2026-10-04
evolution-3-predictive-governance-2026-10-04
evolution-4-governance-differential-2026-10-04
evolution-5-governed-learning-2026-10-04
evolution-7-formal-governance-assurance-2026-10-04
evolution-77-swarm-fabric-2026-11-14
evolution-79-collective-intelligence-2026-11-15
evolution-79-real-intelligence-2026-11-15
evolution-8-governance-compiler-2026-10-04
evolution-80-adaptive-intelligence-2026-11-16
evolution-81-governed-workforce-2026-11-16
evolution-81-sovereign-workforce-2026-11-16
evolution-9-verified-governance-packages-2026-10-04
evolution7-sovereign-action-commit-2026-10-09
factory-of-proof
federation
final-2026-09-24
fleet-kill
formal-2026-09-27
frontier
frontier-trust
frontier20-max-evolution-2026-10-03
governance-receipt-2026-10-01
governed-evolution-2026-10-07
govkernel-evolution01-2026-10-04
hardening-2026-09-21
hermes-2026-10-08
history
ihvrk
installability-2026-10-01
integrations-2026-11-13
invention-atlas-2026-10-06
inventions
ip-hardening-batch1-2026-10-06
ip-hardening-batch2-2026-10-06
ip-hardening-batch3-2026-10-07
ironclad-prompt13-2026-10-11
l5-adaptive-2026-09-28
l5-authority-2026-09-28
l5-governance-2026-09-28
l5-hosted-evolution-2026-09-28
l5-trajectory-system-2026-09-28
legion-authority-2026-10-08
mcpgate-live-2026-09-27
mcpgate-residency-2026-09-29
memory-injection
memprobe
nullius-verifiers-2026-10-27
open-source-2026-11-10
ops-drill-2026-09-26
oracle-2026-10-08
phase1-5-hardening-2026-10-01
phase3-frontier-2026-10-01
policy-evolution
premier-products-2026-10-13
prompts-audit-2026-10-08
proof-fabric
proof-fabric-2026-09-28
proof-fabric-2026-09-29
proof-fabric-2026-09-30
reality-2026-10-08
reappraisal-agent-trust-fabric-2026-10-14
reproducible-build-2026-09-26
review-core-2026-10-09
rollback-drill-2026-09-26
sandbox-services-2026-09-21
security-boundary-2026-09-27
shields
sovereign-evolution-01
sovereign-evolution-02
sovereign-evolution-03
sovereign-evolution-04
sovereign-evolution-05
sovereign-evolution-06
sovereign-evolution-07
sovereign-evolution-07-bundle
sovereign-frontier-evolution16-2026-10-12
sovereign-isolation-2026-10-09
sovereign-reality-evolution18-2026-10-12
sovereign-runtime-2026-10-07
sovereign-trial-2026-10-09
stage-proof-2026-10-01
superior-agentic-mesh-2026-10-08
superior-agentic-mesh-wave2-2026-10-08
superior-agentic-mesh-wave3-2026-10-08
superior-agentic-mesh-wave4-2026-10-08
superior-agentic-mesh-wave5-2026-10-08
test-report-2026-09-26
tlog
top100-remediation-2026-10-07
v1
v13
v2
vagi-audit-index-2026-11-19
vagi-desks-2026-11-19
vagi-model-arm-2026-11-18
vagi-shift-model-arm-2026-11-18
vagi-suite-2026-11-18
valuation-2026-10-05
valuation-2026-10-06
vigil-2026-10-08
Consensus & cluster (38)
asymmetric-partition-2026-09-27
byzantine-cluster-2026-09-21
byzantine-test-2026-09-26
cain35-byzantine
cluster-drills
cluster-evolution-2026-11-15
cluster-fault-test-2026-09-21
cluster-fault-test-2026-09-21-run2
cluster-mr03-node1-restore-2026-11-16
dag-evolution4-2026-09-24
e18-byzantine-counterfactual-governance-2026-10-05
e21-byzantine-economic-coordination-2026-10-05
e21-byzantine-governed-state-2026-10-04
e22-byzantine-global-verification-2026-10-05
e22-byzantine-governed-execution-2026-10-04
e23-byzantine-governed-distributed-execution-2026-10-04
e26-byzantine-distributed-settlement-2026-10-04
e26-byzantine-trust-2026-10-05
e36-byzantine-collective-governance-2026-10-05
e37-byzantine-autonomous-federation-2026-10-05
e38-byzantine-mission-integrity-2026-10-05
four-server-cluster-2026-09-27
hosted-consensus-2026-09-27
hourly-proof
hourly-proof-mr02
hourly-proof-mr03
multi-region-cluster-2026-09-26
partition-test-2026-09-26
pbft-byzantine-evidence-2026-11-16
pbft-evolution2-2026-09-24
pbft-evolution3-2026-09-24
pbft-evolution82-2026-11-16
quorum-qaas-keystone-2026-10-15
release-cain-mr-02-521f84c
release-cain-mr-02-948b189
restore-drill-2026-09-26
restore-validation
storage-loss-drill-2026-09-27
Soak & endurance (28)
soak-120h-mr02-2026-09-29
soak-72h-2026-09-25
soak-multiregion-2026-09-26
soak-multiregion-2026-09-29
soak-multiregion-2026-09-29b
soak-multiregion-2026-10-06
soak-multiregion-2026-10-09
soak-multiregion-2026-10-12
soak-multiregion-2026-10-13
soak-multiregion-2026-10-13b
soak-multiregion-2026-10-14
soak-multiregion-2026-10-17
soak-multiregion-2026-10-18
soak-multiregion-2026-10-21
soak-multiregion-2026-10-25
soak-multiregion-2026-10-26
soak-multiregion-2026-10-28
soak-multiregion-2026-11-02
soak-multiregion-24h-2026-11-02
soak-multiregion-48h-2026-11-15
soak-multiregion-48h-2026-11-15-mr03
soak-multiregion-48h-2026-11-15-mr03b
soak-multiregion-48h-2026-11-15b
soak-multiregion-48h-2026-11-15c
soak-multiregion-48h-2026-11-16-mr03c
soak-multiregion-48h-2026-11-16-mr03d
soak-multiregion-48h-2026-11-18
soak-multiregion-survivor-2026-09-30
Registry, provenance & audit kits (17)
agentic-75-verification-2026-11-13
auditor-kit
cain-free-verification-bundle-2026-11-13
claim-evidence
claims
daily
daily-anchor
e13-decision-integrity-2026-09-28
e34-decision-provenance-2026-10-05
e35-continuous-autonomy-integrity-2026-10-05
ihvrk-kits
integrity-monitor
invention-verification-2026-10-06
record-integrity-2026-10-01
release-81bdf84
release-readiness
trust-integrity-2026-09-28
Proof loop (detect / fix / prove) (11)
falsework-sample-report
keystone-codebase-scan-2026-10-15
keystone-live-2026-11-05
keystone-rekor
keystone-trail
proofloop-bounty
proofloop-daily
proofloop-fresh-eval
proofloop-funnel
proofloop-live-2026-11-15
proofloop-seal
VAGI PROOF FACTORY Every VAGI claim has a run, a verifier, and a published failure boundary. Open the full factory → CAIN-42 Proto-VAGI is the infrastructure governor of AGI. It is not yet AGI; its intelligence results are early and bounded.
VAGI ORGANISM · ALL EVIDENCECAIN-42 Proto-VAGI: early, measured signs of intelligence, and every action it takes comes with a signed receipt.From a single pulse to an organism that learns hidden rules from its own experiments — every step, including the negatives and corrections.
E98 · PulseGAIN
A learned world model improves closed-loop decisions.
35/50 model-based vs 4/50 random (+62.0 pp)
E99 · Rapid heartbeatCORRECTED
Recurrent advantage did not survive E102's re-score; the world model did.
GRU 93/84/88 of 100 vs MLP 68/63/70 vs random 20/24/23
E100–E101 · Integrated organismCORRECTED
Measured on already-solved environments; re-scored by E102.
Delayed 52/60 vs MLP 43/60; hysteresis 58/60 vs 56/60
E102 · Persistent governed organismGAIN
Learns the world while it acts; beats frozen and reactive baselines.
252/300 vs frozen 198/300 vs reactive 154/300 (McNemar p=8.1e-09); 40 poisoned memories: undefended -44.5 pp, causal -1.0 pp
E103 · Transfer and skillsMIXED
Cross-domain transfer positive; skills failed held-out.
service -> grid: faster on 56 vs 14 tasks (p=4.3e-07); grid -> service: 78 vs 52 (p=0.03)
E104 · Strategy switchNEGATIVE
Rejected by the preregistered gate, which prevented a loss.
sealed grid 256 vs 257 of 300; key-and-door 35 vs 35; service lock 18 vs 18; plain service 54 vs 65 (a loss the gate prevented)
E105 · Where preconditions areNEGATIVE
Learned the drain column, but it did not raise success.
edge-lock 24 vs 27 of 100 with vs without the prior; uniform-key worlds 25 vs 26 of 60 (no harm)
E106 · Subgoal + permutation gateSTOPPED
Stopped before a sealed run: the gate was inverted. Nothing claimed.
development only; no sealed run
E107 · Runs its own experimentsGAIN
Interventional attribution + valid gate: more incidents solved, none lost.
edge-lock 91 vs 64 of 200 (27 won, 0 lost, p = 1.5e-08); uniform-key worlds unchanged 57 vs 57 and 74 vs 74
E108 · Learns many kinds of hidden rulesGAIN
Selection-aware gate; four rules in three frames found and used; none lost.
edge 72 vs 41/150 · row0 77 vs 48/150 · start_row 98 vs 74/150 · barrier_adj 101 vs 85/150; uniform controls unchanged (63 vs 63, 57 vs 57)

Every step links to its evidence bundle and offline verifier (hover for limits). TEST results on constructed tasks; no external reviewer. Receipts: the governed boundary issues an Ed25519-signed receipt for every action it admits (E102, loopback); the E107/E108 sealed runs called the world directly and carry no per-action receipts. CAIN-42 Proto-VAGI is the infrastructure governor of AGI; it is not yet AGI. Source code is not published. Auditor index →

E108 the organism learns many kinds of hidden rulesTEST
edge 72 vs 41/150 · row0 77 vs 48/150 · start_row 98 vs 74/150 · barrier_adj 101 vs 85/150; uniform controls unchanged (63 vs 63, 57 vs 57)
From its own experiments the organism found four different hidden laws (a column, a row, its start's row, next to the barrier) in three frames, stayed silent on pattern-free worlds with a selection-aware null, and used each law: 100 incidents won, 0 lost.
Limit: Coordinate laws in designed frames, one constructed domain family; uniform gates off at p 0.318 / 0.21; no per-action receipts in these runs; no external reviewer. Not AGI or VAGI.
E107 the organism runs its own experimentsTEST
edge-lock 91 vs 64 of 200 (27 won, 0 lost, p = 1.5e-08); uniform-key worlds unchanged 57 vs 57 and 74 vs 74
In practice the organism tests one suspect cell at a time to find what opens a blocked passage, learns where such causes tend to be (found the drain column on its own; a permutation gate stays off on worlds with no pattern), and then uses it: 91 vs 64 of 200 sealed incidents solved.
Limit: One regularity type in two constructed domains; the no-pattern gate was off at p = 0.018 (thin margin, likely selection); 1 of 84 edge experiments mis-attributed (disclosed); no external reviewer. Not AGI or VAGI.
E105 learning where hidden preconditions areTEST
edge-lock 24 vs 27 of 100 with vs without the prior; uniform-key worlds 25 vs 26 of 60 (no harm)
From its own experience the organism located the hidden drain configuration (33.0% of its learned lift on the drain column, which is 10% of cells), but using that knowledge did not raise success.
Limit: Knowledge learned, not yet useful; the no-false-pattern guardrail gave a false positive and needs a shuffled-null test; no external reviewer.
E104 hidden-precondition discovery — rejected by the gateTEST
sealed grid 256 vs 257 of 300; key-and-door 35 vs 35; service lock 18 vs 18; plain service 54 vs 65 (a loss the gate prevented)
A strategy switch that looked strong on 16 development tasks was rejected by the preregistered paired gate; the sealed test confirms it does not help and would have hurt one domain.
Limit: Negative result: the hidden-key bottleneck remains open; the bandit's unpaired estimate was misleading; no external reviewer.
E103 cross-domain transfer and skillsTEST
service -> grid: faster on 56 vs 14 tasks (p=4.3e-07); grid -> service: 78 vs 52 (p=0.03)
Experience moves between two verticals: service-configuration memory makes grid tasks faster, and grid memory speeds service incidents on more tasks than it slows. Learned skills did not survive the sealed test.
Limit: Gates 2 PASS / 3 PARTIAL / 3 FAIL; near transfer between analogous domains; no success gain; skills and skill composition FAILED on held-out tasks; no external reviewer.
E102 persistent organism — learns the world while it actsTEST
252/300 vs frozen 198/300 vs reactive 154/300 (McNemar p=8.1e-09); 40 poisoned memories: undefended -44.5 pp, causal -1.0 pp
An online world model (hypothesis posterior, change points, causal memory) beats a frozen model on 300 sealed unfamiliar worlds; causal memory resists poisoning.
Limit: Gates 5 PASS / 10 PARTIAL / 5 FAIL; info-gain probing did not beat random probing; no cross-domain transfer or skills yet; loopback governance, not production MCPGate; no external reviewer.
Integrated organism — held-out family (corrected by E102)TEST
Delayed 52/60 vs MLP 43/60; hysteresis 58/60 vs 56/60
CORRECTED 2026-11-19 by E102 Phase 0: these numbers came from environments that were already solved before the agent acted. Re-scored correctly, GRU 53/60, MLP 57/60, random 4/60, few-shot 56/60 — the recurrent advantage and the adaptation failure do not hold. Original bundle kept unchanged.
Limit: Skill 45/50; failure F1 0.6667; cross-domain and 6-hour BLOCKED; no external reviewer.
Latent generalist — rapid heartbeat (corrected by E102)TEST
GRU 93/84/88 of 100 vs MLP 68/63/70 vs random 20/24/23
CORRECTED 2026-11-19 by E102 Phase 0: these numbers came from already-solved environments that every arm reused in turn. Re-scored correctly, the committed GRU solves 88/86/86 vs random 8/16/12 — the world model is real — but a retrained MLP scores 87/86/86, so the recurrent advantage does not hold. Original bundle kept unchanged.
Limit: Six gain families; skill 32/50; natural-failure F1 0.5455; no external reviewer.
Learned intelligence pulseTEST
35/50 model-based vs 4/50 random (+62.0 pp)
A trained residual neural world model improves closed-loop decisions on a sealed control set.
Limit: Three gain families; skill synthesis 7/24; natural-failure F1 0.0; no external reviewer.
Governor holds at the actionTEST
0 effects after the kill switch; 0 duplicate worker seeds
Every real E98 action was Ed25519-authorized and 3-of-4 BFT-notarized; the kill switch stopped execution.
Limit: In-process CAIN/MCPGate bridge, not a live network MCPGate request.
Evaluation integrityTEST
E96 solver 0/18 on unseen schemas; E97 seed-collision fix 0; skill selection labelled
We audited our own benchmark and downgraded it instead of defending it.
Limit: Same-team audit; no external reviewer. E96 90/90 is template-matched, not general.
VAGI Behavior SuiteTEST
library 500/500 in-distribution; shift 5/100
A 10-domain, 500-task constructed suite with a published failure boundary.
Limit: Hand-written procedure library; constructed tasks; the 5/100 shift is a coverage gap.
Recursive harness improvementTEST
E95: 0/90 → 79/90 held-out composition; familiar 60/60
A measured harness change improved held-out composition, with two candidates rejected.
Limit: Constructed numeric substrate; in-distribution composition; no external reviewer.

Labels: LIVE = production activity; TEST = executed test; SIMULATED = synthetic; BLOCKED = unavailable. No lane is LIVE. No AGI capability claim. CAIN-42 Proto-VAGI is the infrastructure governor of AGI; it is not yet AGI. Every lane is TEST unless marked LIVE; simulated activity is never shown as live.

E98 · VAGI INTELLIGENCE PULSE · MEASURED A learned neural world model moved sealed closed-loop success from 4/50 to 35/50. Evidence + verifier → Mirror →
35/50
model-based, sealed
4/50
random baseline
+62.0 pp
closed-loop gain
0.017954
one-step state MAE
0.022124
calibration ECE

What the pulse is: a trained residual neural ensemble (6902 transitions), closed-loop planning on 50 sealed environments, and a +62.0 pp gain over random. The governor held: every real action was Ed25519-authorized, 3-of-4 BFT-notarized, and the kill switch produced 0 effects after the fence. 10 real OS workers, 0 duplicate seeds.

What it is not: general VAGI intelligence. Skill synthesis is 7/24; natural-failure F1 is 0.0; the environment has three gain families; no external reviewer. These failures are on the front, not hidden.

E95 · RECURSIVE HARNESS IMPROVEMENT A measured weakness, five candidates, two rejections, one frozen held-out gain. Evidence + verifier → Mirror →
79/90
held-out composition, selected harness
0/90
held-out composition, atom baseline
60/60
familiar non-regression (baseline 60/60)
9→9
macros after backward revision

What actually changed: the cognitive harness gained a conditional composition operator over validated actions and an adaptive atom-first fallback. The engine observed 0/90 on development composition, generated five candidates, rejected depth-2 (no gain, higher cost) and unguarded composition (familiar regression), and promoted the adaptive harness. Two large nested-composition families remain unsolved.

Limits, on the front: constructed numeric substrate; harness configuration, not model weights; in-distribution composition over the same development atom pool; one seed set; no external reviewer, no witness, no third-party audit. This is not AGI, not VAGI, and not unrestricted recursive self-improvement.

VAGI PROGRAM · EVIDENCE OF RECORD 10 domains. 500 held-out tasks. The generalization gap is published, not hidden. Raw rows + standalone verifier → Per-domain table →
500/500
procedure library, in-distribution
5/100
unfamiliar variants (distribution shift)
72/500
no-procedure floor
112/500
one fixed procedure
481/500
raw Haiku 5.5, same policy card
74/100
raw Haiku on the shift probe (library 5/100)

Frontier baseline, same policy card, no tools: Haiku 5.5 481/500 (96.2%) and Fable 5.2 96/100. That is why the 500/500 library score is not a frontier-model discriminator; the 5/100 shift is the honest gap. Model baseline + verifier →

Shift probe, raw model: the library scores 5/100; Haiku 5.5 scores 74/100 and Sonnet 5.5 81/100. So the 5/100 is largely a library-coverage gap, not a general-intelligence gap. The probe is adversarial and partly underspecified: the software hidden target is not inferable, and all models scored 0/10 on tool orchestration. Shift baseline + verifier →

Check it here: the button recomputes SHA-256 of /vagi-suite.json in your browser and re-checks every headline count. No CAIN code, no server trust required for the arithmetic.

Not checked yet. The check is deterministic; a failure is shown in red, never hidden. pinned sha256 56876ef17f245a9d…

Limits, on the front: 500/500 is a hand-written procedure ceiling on a constructed suite, not a generalization result. The shift probe is 5/100 for the library, but raw models score far higher, so that number is a library-coverage map, not an AGI test. Gate G3 = PARTIAL: no external verifier, no independent witness. This is not evidence of AGI or VAGI. Self-reported by FIRME AI CORPORATION.

Per-domain counts (in-distribution / distribution shift)
domainin-distributionshift
software repair50/505/10
security triage50/500/10
data analysis50/500/10
business decision50/500/10
science calculation50/500/10
planning50/500/10
memory retrieval50/500/10
tool orchestration50/500/10
recovery50/500/10
governance50/500/10

Suite seed 9402 · generated 2026-11-18T13:59:49.980105+00:00 · 500 held-out tasks · governed arm 500/500. verify_offline.py · daily VAGI evidence ledger

E93 · DAY 1–2 · ALL EVIDENCE · NOT VAGI All the VAGI evidence so far, honestly measured. Raw rows + verifier → Daily VAGI evidence →

Shown: open search with no templates found new procedures that scored 369/510 held-out tasks vs 200 for picking from the supplied library and 87 with no procedures; replicated on new families (367 vs 223 / 114). More verified experience gave steadily better results (87 → 224 → 250 → 311 → 311 → 369). Software bug-fixing: learned from experience 16/30 vs fixed strategy 3/30 (p = 0.002). Kill switch: 20/20 trials, 0 effects after the fence. Claim register · 16-dimension scorecard · 104/104 checks recomputed from raw rows.

Limits: at equal compute synthesis only matches the library (208 vs 200); synthesis tasks are in-distribution; software is at 53%, below the 70% bar; 0 positive transfers; a local model's 34 proposals were all invalid; same team, no external review. Real-domain runs and collaboration are not done yet; a 6-hour mission is in progress. Current designation: Governed agentic intelligence infrastructure (outcome 3 of 3 in the E93 rule). No AGI, VAGI, production or certification claim.

E92 · CORRECTION · NOT DEMONSTRATED We withdrew our E92 procedure-synthesis result. Read the correction → Daily VAGI evidence →

Earlier today this banner said CAIN-42 had generated 3 procedures with no designer-supplied solution (120/120 vs 70/120). A code review found that the "generated" procedures came from four hand-written templates, each the full solution to one task family, and that the three comparison arms all ran the same untuned default program. Procedure generation is not demonstrated. E92 is NOT RELEASED, and gates 3, 4, 5 and 16 are FAIL.

The governance lab (15/15 in-process), the typed DSL and promotion pipeline, and the recomputation of the E91 baseline still stand. Real software defects, the 6-hour mission and independent verification remain BLOCKED. We make no AGI, VAGI, production or certification claim. A real synthesis experiment, with an open search and real baselines, is the first gate of E93.

FOR AI FOUNDERS AND INVESTORS · FIRME AI CORPORATION

CAIN-42 is building the governed infrastructure for vertical general intelligence. Target: 2027.

CAIN-42 gives AI agents memory and enforceable limits. On an independent benchmark it doubled a frontier model's score over no memory, at about one-seventh the cost of the brute-force approach, and every number is published with a verifier you can run yourself.

Autonomous AI agents will not be trusted with real work until something establishes who they are, what they may do, stops them at the point of action, and keeps a record anyone can check. CAIN-42 is that layer, and it is model-independent. Our 2027 goal is Governed Vertical General Intelligence (VAGI) infrastructure: persistent, learning, multi-agent intelligence that stays under enforceable authority. Here is where we stand, measured. Prepare for 2027: the governance layer is being built now, and the evidence is open for you to check.

Measured this week
CAIN memory raised Claude Opus 5.5 on Continual Learning Bench (an outside benchmark) from 0.220 to 0.439 per scan, better on 90/90 scans; reproduced in a fresh run (0.401).
CAIN used 7% of ICL's input tokens and $2.47 vs $17.90 per run: 3.8x more gain per dollar.
Plain in-context learning still scored higher (0.637); CAIN wins on cost, not yet on raw score.
New: CAIN hybrid memory on Claude Opus 5.5 reached 0.478/scan, 75% of plain ICL's 0.637, at $3.81 vs $16.93 per run (23% of the cost; average of 3 runs, which varied widely).
New hybrid memory on Claude Haiku 5.5 (recent context + CAIN long-run table): 0.430/scan, 94% of plain ICL's 0.459 at 29% of its cost, CAIN structured 0.420, basic retrieval 0.220, no memory 0.220.
Second task (CL-Bench poker, Claude Haiku 5.5, 1 run each; profit in big blinds per hand): CAIN hybrid +0.24 vs its no-memory +0.35; plain ICL +0.05 vs +0.21. Second poker run: CAIN hybrid +0.20 vs +0.31; plain ICL +0.02 vs +0.76.
6-hour faulted mission running now; results posted when complete.
Road to VAGI infrastructure (2027)
  • BUILTGoverned execution: identity, authority, resource-side fence, kill switch
  • PARTIALLearning from experience on an outside benchmark (beats no-memory; not yet plain ICL)
  • MEASUREDCost efficiency of learning (gain per dollar vs the best simple method)
  • IN PROGRESSLong-horizon autonomy: 6 h now; 24 h and 72 h next
  • NEXTCross-domain transfer and collective (multi-agent) gains
  • SEEKING PARTNERIndependent third-party evaluation
Check it yourself
Every number above comes from a signed bundle with an offline verifier (84/84 checks). The weak results are published next to the strong ones.
Verify the evidence Preparing for 2027? Request the investor data room today
Self-run results; independent evaluation not yet obtained. VAGI is a 2027 goal, not a current capability. This page is not an offer to sell, or a solicitation of an offer to buy, any security; any offering is made only through definitive documents to eligible investors. Forward-looking statements are goals, not guarantees.
42 claims, each with its proof — open the investor evidence portal
  1. CAIN memory doubled a frontier model's score on an outside benchmark MEASURED
  2. On a frontier model, CAIN hybrid memory reached 75% of the best method's score at about 23% of its cost MEASURED
  3. 3.8x more learning gain per dollar than the brute-force method MEASURED
  4. The benchmark gain reproduced in a separate run MEASURED
  5. Hybrid memory: 94% of the best method's score at 29% of its cost MEASURED
  6. Kill switch: 0 effects after the fence at up to 250 worker processes REPRODUCED
  7. 11 of 11 prior headline results reproduced from raw data REPRODUCED
  8. Signed evidence bundle with an offline verifier that catches tampering VERIFIED
  9. MCPGate runs a tool call only with a consensus-committed authorization bound to that exact action VERIFIED
  10. A 4-node Byzantine-fault-tolerant cluster produced authentic 3-of-4 quorum certificates VERIFIED
  11. Live network-partition tests: an isolated or split cluster commits nothing VERIFIED
  12. Safety held under 10% packet loss, delay, duplication and reordering VERIFIED
  13. Two replicas lost their storage at once and were rebuilt from off-host backups VERIFIED
  14. Live rollback to the previous engine and forward again, one replica at a time VERIFIED
  15. The cluster image rebuilds bit-for-bit from its commit VERIFIED
  16. Every hosted decision record since 2026-09-27 is signed VERIFIED
  17. TLA+ models of consensus and the MCPGate gate, model-checked exhaustively VERIFIED
  18. The consensus fast path's view-change rule was model-checked VERIFIED
  19. DAG data is availability-certified and ordered identically on all 4 nodes VERIFIED
  20. A live 3-member etcd coordination cluster across three US regions VERIFIED
  21. An agent acts only inside a zone of authority the live cluster authorized VERIFIED
  22. Authority leases are invalidated under 9 tested conditions VERIFIED
  23. When authority lapses, the agent's next tool call is refused VERIFIED
  24. A policy change becomes active only after the live cluster commits it VERIFIED
  25. The system governor runs in the production gateway and refuses ungoverned calls VERIFIED
  26. An agent's model or tool change is gated in production; authority is never evolvable VERIFIED
  27. A caught attacker no longer gains autonomy on the production gateway VERIFIED
  28. A public proof fabric anyone can verify: signed manifest and per-file digests VERIFIED
  29. 28 executable safety invariants: no quorum, no authorization, no execution TESTED
  30. 22 kinds of agent operation run through one explicit governed pipeline TESTED
  31. Continuous trajectory governance: only a governance key, never the agent's, authorizes TESTED
  32. Signed, versioned agent identities with key lifecycle and scoped authority TESTED
  33. Changes to an agent's memory, skills, tools or routing must pass a governed gate TESTED
  34. System governance: emergency freeze and quorum-governed state TESTED
  35. Every allowed action yields a proof-of-governance record TESTED
  36. A 17-step governed learning loop over real governance outcomes TESTED
  37. Proof-carrying agency: each governed operation yields one signed proof TESTED
  38. Execution mesh: identity, capability and authority checked before every execution TESTED
  39. Governed agent factory: a mission compiles into a bounded agent specification TESTED
  40. Governed multi-agent action: agents act on the world only through governed decisions TESTED
  41. A recorded real run of the defined CAIN-42 test suites TESTED
  42. We attacked our own decision path, found holes in nine areas and fixed them TESTED
E91 · LEARNS FROM VERIFIED EXPERIENCE · 6 DOMAINS Learning from verified experience: governed agent 114/160 (71.2%) → 153/160 (95.6%) on 160 unseen tasks in 6 domains (exact McNemar p<0.001); all of the gain came from promoted, checker-verified procedures (no change on tasks without one: 44→44 of 50). Cross-domain transfer: a skill learned only in software fault isolation raised industrial fault diagnosis 5/10→10/10; experiment design learned in science raised business pricing decisions 7/10→10/10; on look-alike tasks where they do not apply the gate refused them (blind reuse would score 2/10 and 0/10). Causal reasoning 40/40 vs 30/40; 41/41 attacks blocked; kill switch 0.15 ms, 0 effects after; 59.4-min faulted mission, 7,200 verified, 0 duplicates. Multi-agent: no collaboration benefit demonstrated (single agent 10/20 beat every team under a shared tool budget). Claude Haiku 5.5, $0.31 total. Constructed tasks, self-run, PARTIAL EVIDENCE; no independent witness. Verify E91 bundle (91/91) → Limitations →
E89 · GOVERNED AUTONOMOUS INTELLIGENCE INFRASTRUCTURE External benchmark (Continual Learning Bench, not written by us): CAIN memory raised Claude Opus 5.5 from 0.220 to 0.439 per scan, better on 90/90 scans, 3 runs. Plain in-context learning with the same model scored higher: 0.637/scan (beat CAIN on 82 of 90 scans, 1 run). CAIN used 7% of ICL's input tokens and $2.47 vs $17.90 per run: 3.8x more gain per dollar. New: CAIN hybrid memory on Claude Opus 5.5 reached 0.478/scan, 75% of plain ICL's 0.637, at $3.81 vs $16.93 per run (23% of the cost; average of 3 runs, which varied widely). Replication by us (fresh process, 2 runs): 0.401/scan. New hybrid memory on Claude Haiku 5.5 (recent context + CAIN long-run table): 0.430/scan, 94% of plain ICL's 0.459 at 29% of its cost, CAIN structured 0.420, basic retrieval 0.220, no memory 0.220. Second task (CL-Bench poker, Claude Haiku 5.5, 1 run each; profit in big blinds per hand): CAIN hybrid +0.24 vs its no-memory +0.35; plain ICL +0.05 vs +0.21. Second poker run: CAIN hybrid +0.20 vs +0.31; plain ICL +0.02 vs +0.76. 6-hour faulted mission: in progress. E88 reproduced 11/11 from raw rows. Goal: VAGI infrastructure by 2027 — not yet demonstrated. Self-run, 0 independent witnesses, not released. Verify E89 bundle (84/84) → Benchmark numbers → Limitations →
E86 · AGI INFRASTRUCTURE FOUNDATION Two complementary tracks: (A) governed intelligence foundation, 14/14 offline; (B) frontier + atomic kill fence, 13/13. Both NOT RELEASED · 0 independent witnesses · no AGI claim · no production deployment. E86 evidence registry → Verify track A → Verify track B →
E85 EVIDENCE Evolution 85 measured: 100 held-out tasks, 9 arms, 2,122 real local model calls, 0 remote; ten-scope kill switch; 1 h endurance. Signed bundle, 75 files, 43/43 offline checks. Decision: NOT RELEASED; 0 independent witnesses. Verify bundle → Final report → Acceptance matrix →
AGI INFRASTRUCTURE · E86 An external agent registered, received scoped authority, executed through the governed boundary, and produced a receipt verified offline; the mission completed only with independent evidence. Fenced stop: 0 effects after the engage transaction at 50 workers. Frontier Sonnet 5.5: 65/100 with validated strategies. 43 tests. Not AGI achieved; not independently certified; NOT RELEASED. Verify E86 bundle → Final report →
GOVERNOR OF VERTICAL AGI LIVE EVIDENCE SURFACE E82 · 2026-11-17 FIRME AI CORPORATION loading clock…

CAIN-42 Proto-VAGI is the infrastructure governor of AGI.

Not another model. CAIN-42 is the authority, enforcement and evidence layer that decides whether a vertical AGI may act — then proves what actually happened. Every consequential action is bound to an identity, a delegated authority, an intent, a policy decision, a single-use capability and an observed effect. The record is signed, hash-chained and re-checkable by a verifier that imports no CAIN code.

ZERO-CAIN VERIFIER THIRD-PARTY VERIFICATION KIT 0 EXTERNAL REPRODUCTIONS · BE THE FIRST 240-FILE SIGNED BUNDLE 55/55 OFFLINE CHECKS 10/10 TAMPER MUTATIONS REJECTED 86/86 SAME-PROJECT LAB BLOCKED 0 REMOTE MODEL CALLS MERKLE 63868034…
60-SECOND VERIFICATION 1 · Drag the ZIP into your browser → SHA-256 2 · node verify_e82_node.mjs bundle → 40/40 3 · python3 verify_e82_offline.py bundle → 55/55 Open the verifier →

Live governor console

REAL ENDPOINTS · NO MOCK VERDICT

Loading the live scenario list from /fabric/try…

Your text selects the nearest registered test scenario. The page never executes your text.

Pick a scenario, then run the real decision pipeline.

The verdict is whatever the live /fabric/try endpoint returns. If it is down, the widget says so and shows no verdict. See the live stage list →

Live surface

FETCHED NOW
Decision pipelineCHECKING…
PBFT quorumCHECKING…
AETHER-33 invariantsCHECKING…
Public manifestCHECKING…
The governor's contract. No authorization → no execution. Only ALLOW executes. Unknown, error, expired, revoked, replayed or stale-fenced states never become permission. A model, memory, router, reputation or skill may propose; none may authorize.

“Governor” is an architectural role: it authorizes, enforces, records and verifies at the action boundary. It is not a regulator, a certification body or a government designation.

Download the evidence. Run the verifier. No CAIN code.

REPEATABLE · OFFLINE · SHA-256

1 · Signed evidence bundle

240 files: raw rows, model ledger, mission events, recovery records, gates, Merkle root and Ed25519 signature. 1.1 MB ZIP.

⬇ CAIN42_E82_EVIDENCE_BUNDLE.zip

2 · Standalone verifier

Python standard library + cryptography. Imports no CAIN module. Recomputes the headline numbers from the raw rows.

⬇ verify_e82_offline.py

3 · Manifest, signature, key

Check the bundle against the detached signature and the published Ed25519 public key. The key is self-generated; no independent witness.

MANIFEST.json .sig key

4 · Audit and acceptance

44 artifact-derived gates: 42 PASS / 2 BLOCKED. Conditional release, blockers and the full final audit.

Final audit Decision

5 · Integrity list

SHA-256 for the ZIP, verifier, manifest, signature and key. Compare before you unpack.

SHA256SUMS.txt

6 · Historical evidence

E81 governed workforce bundle, preserved unmodified, including its known forked gate log reported honestly.

E81 bundle

What “independent” means here: independent of CAIN code, not independent of the project. The verifier is a third-party-capable kit. A third-party audit and an independent witness are still NOT PERFORMED.

The technical case: why vertical AGI needs a governor, not another model

1. Vertical AGI is an actor, not a chat model.

A vertical AGI is a domain-specialised system that acts: it plans, calls tools, edits repositories, queries databases, moves money, changes infrastructure, and delegates to other agents. Its failure mode is not a bad paragraph. Its failure mode is an unauthorized effect — a destructive write, a credential exfiltration, a payment, a clinical or financial action that should never have crossed the boundary. Prompt filters inspect the conversation channel; the effect happens in the execution channel. That gap is the governance problem vertical AGI creates.

2. The governor is a runtime, not a guardrail.

CAIN-42 places a deterministic control plane between the proposal and the effect. The canonical path is WHO → AUTHORITY → INTENT → SECURITY CONTEXT → POLICY → RISK → TRUST → PREDICTION → DECISION → ENFORCEMENT → EXECUTION → EFFECT → EVIDENCE → CAUSALITY → COUNTERFACTUAL → OUTCOME → TRUST UPDATE. The model is interchangeable: local Qwen and SmolLM weights, a hosted frontier model, or a customer's own model. The agent framework is interchangeable: MCP, A2A, LangGraph, AutoGen, CrewAI or a bespoke runtime. The governor does not care which model proposed the action; it cares whether the exact action is authorized, whether enforcement actually halted it, and whether the observed effect matches the intent.

3. Authority is a lease, not a permission.

An agent never receives standing authority. It receives a signed, scope-bound, short-lived, single-use capability bound to the exact tool, arguments, tenant, mission and expiry. Delegation is attenuating: a child can never hold more authority than its parent. Every claim is re-checked at the boundary — signature, agent, tool, scope hash, expiry, fencing token, revocation, replay, budget. A stale worker cannot commit after losing its lease. A replayed grant cannot produce a second effect. An unknown or errored state fails closed. This is the difference between “the model promised not to” and “the system cannot”.

4. Evidence is the product.

Every governed action produces a receipt: the canonical action, the signed grant, the policy and risk decision, the enforcement event, the execution, the observed effect, and the hashes that bind them. Receipts are SHA-256 chained and rolled into an RFC 6962 Merkle root. The public bundle ships a standalone verifier that imports none of CAIN-42's code — only Python's standard library and cryptography. It recomputes the headline numbers from the raw rows instead of trusting a report. That is what makes the claim repeatable: an engineer can download the bundle, run the verifier, and get the same 55 checks on their own machine.

5. One spine, many verticals.

Vertical AGI does not need one model per domain; it needs one authority and evidence spine that every domain-specific agent plugs into. CAIN-42 supplies that spine: identity federation, delegated authority, capability tokens, deterministic policy, predictive blast radius, the enforcement boundary, the evidence fabric, the adversarial engine and the autonomous control loop. The verticals differ in their detectors, policies, tools and risk models — software engineering, cybersecurity, finance, medicine, legal information, infrastructure, research. They do not differ in the question that matters: was this exact action authorized, enforced, executed and proved?

6. Measured, not asserted.

E82 measured 1,182 real local model calls and 0 remote calls. Ten genuinely simultaneous local model inferences ran; 25 process-local workers were blocked by memory rather than overclaimed; 50 and 100 concurrent workers ran against a shared serialised model and the page reports simultaneous inference = 1. A one-hour real wall-clock campaign completed 165 tasks with 0 failures and 0 duplicate effects. Cross-host failover completed with RPO 0.025 s, RTO 2.557 s, a stale writer refused and 0 duplicate effects. A real host reboot interrupted an active mission; 20/20 tasks recovered, the boot id changed, and durable identity survived. The adversarial lab blocked 86/86 scenarios. The collaboration and specialist-prompt experiments produced negative results and those negatives are preserved.

7. What remains unproven — stated on the page.

No third-party audit, SOC 2, ISO 42001 certification or independent witness exists. The signing key is self-generated. No remote model was called because no credential was injected. No production service was deployed. 25 process-local workers are memory-blocked; 6/24/72/168-hour endurance was not attempted. The PBFT cluster is vendor-operated and remains quarantined for customer anchoring after the 2026-11-15 safety incident. “Governor” is an architectural role, not a regulatory designation, and CAIN-42 does not claim to have achieved AGI. The evidence is reproducible; the ambition is not allowed to overwrite it.

Third-party status, in plain words. The verifier is a third-party verification kit: it imports no CAIN code and can be run by anyone. That is not the same as a third-party audit. No external auditor has certified CAIN-42, no independent witness has cosigned the Merkle root, and the signing key is self-generated. We publish the distinction because the difference is the point. See the full list of what is not built or not authorized →

Public evidence surface: E82 · 2026-11-17 · FIRME AI CORPORATION. All live panels call same-origin public endpoints; if an endpoint is down, the panel says NOT LIVE and invents nothing. The page does not execute your text. No production deployment, DNS, Stripe, firewall or credential change was made for this page.

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CAIN-42 is a Byzantine trust fabric and the governed execution paradigm for autonomous AI. MCPGate is its enforcement boundary. The Agentic 75 is its operating model for agentic AI in 2027: 75 governed products, each with a runnable engine, a signed sample and an offline verifier. See the 75 →Proof Standard →Integrations →
CAIN-42 network
MCPGateby CAIN-42 Proto-VAGI
cluster: …Get a free API key

THE 2027 STANDARD · CAIN-42 AGENTIC 75

The 2027 standard for agentic autonomy

The integration of the CAIN-42 Agentic 75 suite is a foundational shift for autonomous AI: away from probabilistic prompt-layer suggestions and toward deterministic, zero-trust execution governance. As multi-agent systems and autonomous swarms scale into production through 2027, prompt-based alignment and conversational guardrails have repeatedly proven insufficient. The Agentic 75 architecture shifts control from the model’s intent to the system’s physical and computational execution boundaries.

1. Execution-Layer Governance Over Probabilistic Prompt Filters

Traditional AI safety operates almost entirely in the conversation channel, parsing natural-language instructions and trying to filter malicious tokens before the model processes them. Autonomous agents do not merely converse: they invoke tools, write files, run shell commands, modify databases and transfer capital through protocols such as the Model Context Protocol (MCP).

  • The paradigm shift: CAIN-42 intercepts governed requests at the execution boundary before the side effect occurs. Calls that bypass the boundary are not governed by it; that limit is stated openly.
  • Mechanism: every governed tool call routed through the boundary is evaluated against authorization boundaries, structural schemas and policy rules. If an action lacks verified permission it is blocked before execution. Unknown or errored states default to denial rather than model judgment.

2. Proof-Carrying Software and Tamper-Evident WORM Auditing

Verifying that an autonomous agent behaved correctly during a multi-hour or multi-day coding session should not require trusting verbose logs or post-hoc summaries.

  • The paradigm shift: the Agentic 75 introduces proof-carrying development and operation. CAIN LongProof, CAIN LoopTrace and the Tamper-Evident WORM Evidence Notary generate tamper-evident, hash-chained records with Ed25519 signatures and SHA-256/RFC 6962 Merkle roots.
  • Mechanism: governed actions, decisions and state changes produce cryptographically verifiable artifacts that anyone can re-run and verify offline without importing CAIN code. The record proves integrity and binding to the supplied evidence; it does not prove the evidence is complete or true. The design is intended to support EU AI Act record-keeping under Articles 12, 19, 26(6) and 73(6). No notified body has reviewed CAIN and no certification is claimed.

3. Byzantine-Resilient Quorum Co-Signing

Single-server logging architectures remain vulnerable to administrative tampering, compromised internal endpoints and silent state overwrites.

  • The paradigm shift: CAIN-42 can have governed records ordered and co-signed by a multi-region Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) cluster: N=4, f=1, Q=3, across four Vultr regions under one account. That is geographic separation, not provider or administrative independence.
  • Mechanism: hosted decisions are evaluated and co-signed by a 3-of-4 quorum. The consensus layer orders and co-signs; it cannot override a denial or manufacture permission. A compromised replica cannot silently change a quorum record — this is tamper-evident assurance, not an absolute guarantee against every hostile deployment. The quorum is operated by FIRME AI CORPORATION, not an independent witness network.

4. Granular Runtime Cages and Rapid Swarm Containment

Autonomous agent swarms running in parallel create catastrophic blast radiuses if a loop goes rogue, hallucinates destructive arguments or is steered by prompt injection.

  • The paradigm shift: the Agentic 75 provides fine-grained runtime isolation combined with fleet-wide emergency circuit breakers.
  • Mechanism: tools are wrapped in execution boundaries such as CAIN RuntimeCage and the MCPGate Boundary Appliance. Cross-process SQLite WAL synchronization shares revocation state, and the local containment path is measured and reported with its tests. We do not claim an unmeasured global sub-50ms guarantee or instantaneous cross-region revocation; distributed propagation is a separate, measured question.

5. Deterministic Defect Detection and Automated Verification

AI-written code has a familiar failure mode: uncomputed results, hard-coded success claims and security checks written to return unconditional approval.

  • The paradigm shift: deterministic static analysis (FALSEWORK) alongside KEYSTONE and PROOFLOOP requires evidence, not confidence, before a fix is accepted.
  • Mechanism: a patch proposed by an AI coding agent is validated only when an independent test suite fails on the vulnerable code, passes on the patched code inside a locked sandbox, and clears structural safety re-scans. This produces verifiable evidence about that test and that patch; it is not a proof of general correctness, and FALSEWORK is heuristic — determinism is not correctness.

NO VERIFIED IDENTITY → NO VALID AUTHORITY → NO GOVERNED EXECUTION.

AGENT PROPOSES→CAIN DECIDES→MCPGATE ENFORCES→SYSTEM EXECUTES→EVIDENCE REMEMBERS

Summary: The 2027 Standard for Agentic Autonomy

The CAIN-42 Agentic 75 architecture redefines AI agents by proving that capability does not equal authority. By combining zero-trust execution gating, Byzantine quorum co-signing, offline-verifiable evidence and independent test validation, it turns autonomous agents from unpredictable experiments into accountable, auditable systems.

It does not turn every engine into a certified production control. The claim is narrower and testable: show the record, and let anyone re-check it.

What is verified today

  • 75 of 75 Agentic products are DELIVERABLE, each with published rules and a live try-it.
  • All 75 signed samples re-verify offline with their own pinned key.
  • 2,598 Agentic 75 tests pass; the catalog selftest is 75/75.
  • The public evidence bundle is on clawx.click, with a verifier that imports no CAIN code.

What is not claimed

  • Not a production assessment for every engine: several are static, heuristic or simulation-only, and say so.
  • Not universal enforcement: only calls routed through the declared boundary are governed.
  • Not a global real-time revocation guarantee, hardware-attested identity, or independent certification.
  • No SOC 2, ISO 42001, EU AI Act certification or third-party audit.
  • The validator quorum is vendor-operated, not an independent witness network.

The model is a commodity. The closing loop is the moat: detect → act → prove → sign → verify offline. Built by FIRME AI CORPORATION — Vicente Fernando Noriega (founder) and his two co-founders.

E82 · 2026-11-17 · GOVERNED VERTICAL AGI The evidence is live at the top of this page. A live decision console, a zero-CAIN offline verifier, the signed 240-file bundle and the honest limits. No E81 workforce banner is used here.
Verify the evidence ↑

$ mcpgate --policy "no authorization, no execution"

The authorization boundary for MCP tool calls.

MCPGate sits between your AI agent and the MCP servers it calls. Every tools/call is stopped at the boundary. It goes through only when CAIN-42's validator quorum has committed an authorization bound to that exact call: the tool, the arguments, the scope, the identity, the security context and an expiry, usable once. Anything unknown, malformed or unauthorized gets a JSON-RPC error and never reaches your server.

CAIN-42
agent ⇄ MCPGate ⇄ mcp-server · JSON-RPC 2.0
# the agent asks for a tool call
→ {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":7,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"send_payment","arguments":{"to":"acct-991","amount":25000}}}

# MCPGate: no quorum-committed authorization for this exact call, so it never reaches the server
← {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":7,"error":{"code":-32000,
     "message":"CAIN Frontier Gate DENIED execution of 'send_payment': …",
     "data":{"decision":"DENY","action":"send_payment","enforcement":"BLOCKED_AT_BOUNDARY","evidence_hash":"…"}}}

The error format is the one in the proxy's code (SECURITY_DENIAL = -32000, enforcement: BLOCKED_AT_BOUNDARY). Malformed requests get -32600.

The architectural case

More capable agents. Explicit authority. Verifiable evidence.

An instruction is not an enforcement boundary.

Long-running agents and coordinated swarms need more than instructions. They need clearly bounded authority, enforceable tool access, operational continuity, and records that can be checked. These 13 talks and demonstrations explain complementary parts of that challenge. Every one can be played on this page.

An agent's ability to propose an action is not the same as its authority to execute it. CAIN-42 is designed to place an enforceable authorization boundary between AI agents and governed tools or real-world effects, with evidence of authorization decisions.

The goal is not to make agents less useful. It is to make broader autonomy practical by keeping permissions, limits, revocation, and evidence outside the model's discretion. Prompts guide behavior. Execution controls determine which governed actions may actually run. Security-critical authorization should not depend solely on the model following its prompt.

The industry is converging on the execution layer

The same requirement is now being described in public by some of the largest names in the field, each from its own position. Speakers and publishers in the 13 sources below include:

  • Anthropic
  • AWS
  • Microsoft (speaker)
  • NVIDIA
  • Visa
  • Okta
  • Kong
  • The Linux Foundation
  • LF Decentralized Trust
  • Moonshot AI (Kimi)
  • EnforceAuth

Independent sources, not CAIN endorsements. These sources discuss related architectures and engineering principles. None of them mentions CAIN-42. CAIN-specific capabilities and performance require CAIN-specific evidence, which is linked on every card.

Where the boundary sits

  1. ProposeAn agent or swarm proposes an action.
  2. CheckThe authorization boundary checks policy and delegated authority.
  3. Execute if authorizedThe governed tool runs only on ALLOW.
  4. RecordDecision and execution evidence are recorded as supported.
  5. Monitor and revokeMonitoring and revocation stay available within the documented scope.

A recorded authorization decision shows what was permitted. It does not prove the action succeeded, and not every external effect can be reversed.

What this means

  • Prompts guide the agent.
  • Policies define permitted actions.
  • Enforcement controls governed execution.
  • Evidence supports later verification.
  • Revocation limits future authorized activity within the system's actual coverage.

MCPGate sits in the request path between the agent and the MCP server: agent, then MCPGate, then server. It reads each JSON-RPC tools/call, checks the tool and its arguments against a scoped, expiring, single-use authorization, and forwards the call only on ALLOW. Anything unknown, malformed or unauthorized is answered with a JSON-RPC error and never reaches the server; if the gate itself errors, the call is refused. The boundary covers calls routed through MCPGate. A tool the agent can reach another way, or with a credential MCPGate never sees, is outside it, so deployments must make the gate the only route.

Watch the 13 sources

13 relevant talks and demonstrations.

  1. SOURCE 01 OF 13 · OPEN-SOURCE PROJECT TALK

    Policy-Checked, Attributable, Revocable, Provable AI Agent Authorization

    Speaker names not confirmed in this review · published by LF Decentralized Trust · 2026-10-02 (streamed live)

    • Authorization and identity
    • Evidence and trust

    How it relates to CAIN-42: It makes the same separation CAIN-42 is built on: what an agent is able to do is a different question from what it holds authority to do, and the second must be answered outside the model.

    What it explains, how CAIN applies it, and what it does not prove
    What the source explains
    Introduces Caracal, an open-source AI authorization project in the LF Decentralized Trust mentorship program. The publisher's description says it covers why API-key and identity models fall short for agents, what authority means for autonomous systems, and an architecture for policy-based authorization, attribution, revocation and auditability.
    How CAIN applies this principle
    MCPGate refuses a governed tools/call that does not carry a signed, short-lived capability token bound to that call's parameters and usable once. A changed argument or a replayed token is refused. Implemented; public evidence limited
    What this does not prove
    Caracal is a separate project. Its talk does not mention, validate or endorse CAIN-42.
    CAIN evidence and documentation
    Try a blocked tool call in the MCPGate playground · Where MCPGate sits in the request path
  2. SOURCE 02 OF 13 · INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL PRESENTATION

    Trust and Guardrails Governing Autonomous AI Agents on Azure

    Nicholas Chang · published by Nicholas Chang (individual channel) · 2026-10-24

    • Authorization and identity

    How it relates to CAIN-42: That dedicated layer between proposal and execution is the position CAIN-42 occupies.

    What it explains, how CAIN applies it, and what it does not prove
    What the source explains
    Per the publisher's description: authorization changes once software interprets intent and acts for a user. Agents should have their own identities and narrowly scoped permissions, and policy such as spending limits and approval thresholds should live in a dedicated layer between the agent's proposed action and execution, not inside a prompt.
    How CAIN applies this principle
    CAIN decisions are made per proposed action. Only ALLOW is executable; REQUIRE_APPROVAL pauses for a person; unknown or error states are denied. Budget and spending envelopes exist in the AOS mission runtime, which is a reference implementation. Implemented; public evidence limited
    What this does not prove
    This is an individual's presentation about building on Azure. It is not presented here as official Microsoft policy.
    CAIN evidence and documentation
    Try a blocked tool call in the MCPGate playground · Agentic 75 governance map
  3. SOURCE 03 OF 13 · VENDOR PRESENTATION

    How to Build Audit-Ready Governance for Autonomous AI Agents | Okta

    Okta speakers (The AI Identity Summit) · published by Okta · 2026-07-16

    • Authorization and identity
    • Evidence and trust

    How it relates to CAIN-42: Attributable actions and permission management across an agent's whole lifecycle, including the ability to stop it, are core CAIN-42 requirements.

    What it explains, how CAIN applies it, and what it does not prove
    What the source explains
    Per the publisher's description: a masterclass on keeping a traceable, verifiable audit trail as autonomous systems act for an enterprise, moving from static security snapshots to continuously enforced identity controls, with clear ownership and accountability.
    How CAIN applies this principle
    Every MCPGate decision is tied to an agent identity and written to a hash-chained, signed record. Revocation is checked mid-flight at the boundary, and a fleet quarantine (kill switch) stops further authorized actions by an agent or swarm. Implemented; public evidence limited
    What this does not prove
    "Audit-ready" is the vendor's phrase, not an independent compliance finding, for Okta or for CAIN-42. A kill switch stops future governed actions; it does not undo completed ones.
    CAIN evidence and documentation
    CAIN-42 evidence registry · Offline verifiers
  4. SOURCE 04 OF 13 · VENDOR PRESENTATION AND DEMONSTRATION

    Agentic Identity: Securing MCP Servers with Kong AI Gateway

    Andrew, product manager at Kong (as named by the publisher) · published by Kong · 2026-11-05

    • Authorization and identity

    How it relates to CAIN-42: A gateway placed between agents and MCP tools, acting as both network and identity perimeter, is the architectural position of MCPGate.

    What it explains, how CAIN applies it, and what it does not prove
    What the source explains
    Per the publisher's description: agents should stop carrying every credential themselves and route actions through a governed gateway. Covers monitoring MCP traffic, inbound identity, outbound credential translation, token vaulting and fine-grained authorization policy at the gateway.
    How CAIN applies this principle
    MCPGate is a JSON-RPC proxy (stdio and HTTP) between an agent and its MCP servers. A tools/call that is unknown, malformed or unauthorized gets a JSON-RPC error and is not forwarded to the server. Implemented; public evidence limited
    What this does not prove
    A gateway governs only the calls routed through it. Tools reached with other credentials or by another path are outside its control, for Kong's gateway and for MCPGate alike.
    Publisher's chapter timestamps
    5:59 Gateway identity perimeter · 8:17 MCP governance ladder · 23:25 Gateway authorization models
    CAIN evidence and documentation
    Where MCPGate sits in the request path · Try a blocked tool call in the MCPGate playground
  5. SOURCE 05 OF 13 · CONFERENCE TALK

    Trust Is the Next Bottleneck: Why the Agentic Economy Needs Confidential Computing

    Pawan Khandavilli, Microsoft · published by The Linux Foundation · 2026-07-17

    • Evidence and trust

    How it relates to CAIN-42: CAIN-42 shares the goal of substantiating execution claims with evidence that a relying party can check, instead of only recording an identity.

    What it explains, how CAIN applies it, and what it does not prove
    What the source explains
    Per the publisher's abstract: agents can authenticate but cannot yet prove what actually ran. OAuth handles authorization, not runtime integrity; prompt-level governance shapes intent, not enforceable policy. The talk applies hardware attestation and measured execution to agent trust and names four gaps, including measured policy-as-code and portable attestation evidence.
    How this informs CAIN's roadmap
    CAIN-42 today produces software-signed, hash-chained records with offline verifiers. Hardware-backed attestation is on the roadmap: an appraisal engine exists in code, and no trusted-execution hardware is deployed. Planned
    What this does not prove
    Signed application records are not hardware attestation. CAIN-42 does not claim hardware-attested execution.
    CAIN evidence and documentation
    Offline verifiers
  6. SOURCE 06 OF 13 · VENDOR PRODUCT PRESENTATION

    The Authorization Gap: Securing Autonomous AI at Runtime

    EnforceAuth · published by EnforceAuth · 2026-05-20

    • Authorization and identity

    How it relates to CAIN-42: Per-action authorization during ongoing agent activity, rather than a one-time login check, is how CAIN-42 treats authority.

    What it explains, how CAIN applies it, and what it does not prove
    What the source explains
    Per the publisher's description: the central question for AI security moves from "who are you?" to "what are you allowed to do right now?", answered by runtime authorization enforcement with policy-as-code and auditability for agents, machine identities and MCP tools.
    How CAIN applies this principle
    Each governed call is decided at the moment it is proposed. The proxy fails closed: a gate error, an unknown trust state or an unavailable replay store refuses the call. Implemented; public evidence limited
    What this does not prove
    Latency, scale and "immutable" audit figures in this video are the vendor's own claims about its own product. They are not repeated here and say nothing about CAIN-42.
    CAIN evidence and documentation
    Try a blocked tool call in the MCPGate playground
  7. SOURCE 07 OF 13 · CONFERENCE TALK

    Claude for Long-Horizon Tasks

    Lance Martin, Anthropic · published by AI Engineer · 2026-07-22 (premiered)

    • Long-running agents

    How it relates to CAIN-42: Separating the reasoning model from the environment where actions run is where an authorization boundary naturally sits. The talk covers the harness; CAIN-42 covers who may act through it.

    What it explains, how CAIN applies it, and what it does not prove
    What the source explains
    Per the publisher's description: lessons on building agent harnesses for reliable and secure long-horizon work, including decoupling the brain and hands, self-verification, self-learning, and designing harnesses that evolve.
    How CAIN applies this principle
    The CAIN AOS mission runtime journals each step, writes an execution intent before an effect, and requires independent verification before a mission is accepted. It is a reference implementation and is not deployed. Demonstration only
    What this does not prove
    Session persistence is not authorization enforcement, and this talk is about Anthropic's platform, not CAIN-42.
    CAIN evidence and documentation
    Agentic 75 governance map
  8. SOURCE 08 OF 13 · WORKSHOP

    Anthropic Workshop: Build Agents That Run for Hours

    Ash Prabaker and Andrew Wilson · published by AI Engineer · 2026-05-18 (premiered)

    • Long-running agents

    How it relates to CAIN-42: If an agent runs for hours, its permissions and stop controls have to stay meaningful for hours. The workshop's point that a producer should not grade itself matches CAIN-42's rule that a producer never verifies its own work.

    What it explains, how CAIN applies it, and what it does not prove
    What the source explains
    Per the publisher's description: why self-evaluation is a trap and adversarial evaluator agents work better, why structured handoffs beat context compaction for coherence drift, decomposing work into testable contracts, and reading traces as the main debugging loop.
    How CAIN applies this principle
    In the CAIN workforce fabric a result is accepted only after a different agent re-checks it. Published endurance evidence is scoped: one continuous one-hour mission (252 of 252 tasks verified) and 1,018 aggregate worker-hours across concurrent workers. Implemented and publicly evidenced
    What this does not prove
    Hours of demonstrated operation in a workshop do not establish multi-day endurance, and CAIN-42 has not demonstrated a multi-day mission.
    Publisher's chapter timestamps
    2:29 Challenges: context, planning and judgment · 17:28 State-of-the-art harness patterns · 25:04 The generator-evaluator contract
    CAIN evidence and documentation
    Evolution 81 workforce evidence bundle
  9. SOURCE 09 OF 13 · CONFERENCE TALK

    Your Old Prompts Are Making Claude Worse

    Lance Martin, Anthropic · published by AI Engineer · 2026-11-06

    • Long-running agents

    How it relates to CAIN-42: Reliable autonomy is a system-engineering problem as well as a prompt-writing one. Prompts still matter; they guide the agent.

    What it explains, how CAIN applies it, and what it does not prove
    What the source explains
    Per the publisher's description: auditing prompts for outdated habits, using the prompt cache, designing evals a model can climb, and how a managed-agent harness that separates brain from hands keeps days-long agents reliable and secure.
    How CAIN applies this principle
    CAIN-42 keeps security-critical authorization out of the prompt: a model, a memory or a plan may propose an action, and none of them can authorize one. Implemented; public evidence limited
    What this does not prove
    The talk does not say prompts are unnecessary, and neither does CAIN-42. Cost and benchmark figures in the talk are Anthropic's own.
    Publisher's chapter timestamps
    1:32 Audit your prompts · 18:53 Harnesses for days-long agents · 20:21 Managed agents: separating brain from hands
    CAIN evidence and documentation
    Agentic 75 governance map
  10. SOURCE 10 OF 13 · COURSE LESSON AND DEMONSTRATION

    Multi-Agent Patterns: Agent Swarms

    AWS Developers (Strands Agents course, chapter 12) · published by AWS Developers · 2026-07-14

    • Swarms

    How it relates to CAIN-42: When leadership moves between agents, authority has to stay explicit at every handoff. That is the delegation problem CAIN-42 addresses.

    What it explains, how CAIN applies it, and what it does not prove
    What the source explains
    Per the publisher's description: in a swarm, agents share a workspace, each with its own tools, prompt and specialization. They hand off to each other dynamically and no single agent is permanently in charge.
    How CAIN applies this principle
    In the CAIN workforce fabric a worker acts only under a signed grant attenuated from its mission, plus a single-use ticket for one task. A child cannot exceed its parent's envelope, and registering a worker grants nothing. Implemented and publicly evidenced
    What this does not prove
    Swarm coordination does not by itself demonstrate security, correctness or general intelligence.
    Publisher's chapter timestamps
    1:30 Configuration and safety · 2:48 Execution and shared state
    CAIN evidence and documentation
    Evolution 81 workforce evidence bundle
  11. SOURCE 11 OF 13 · PRODUCT DEMONSTRATION

    Meet Kimi K2.6 Agent Swarm

    Kimi AI · published by Kimi AI (Moonshot AI) · 2026-04-22

    • Swarms

    How it relates to CAIN-42: Hundreds of sub-agents taking thousands of steps make bounded authority and per-agent attribution a practical necessity.

    What it explains, how CAIN applies it, and what it does not prove
    What the source explains
    A product demonstration of the Kimi K2.6 Agent Swarm. The publisher advertises up to 300 sub-agents and 4,000 coordinated steps; those are the publisher's figures.
    How CAIN applies this principle
    CAIN-42 has run 1,000 real worker processes on one host, each with its own generated Ed25519 identity and every result independently re-checked. Those workers ran deterministic tools, not model reasoning. Implemented and publicly evidenced
    What this does not prove
    Advertised scale is not evidence of reliability, and CAIN-42's worker count is not a claim about model intelligence.
    CAIN evidence and documentation
    Evolution 81 workforce evidence bundle
  12. SOURCE 12 OF 13 · VENDOR PRESENTATION

    Visa Intelligent Commerce: Building Trust for the Future of Agentic Commerce

    Visa · published by Visa · 2026-05-27

    • Commerce and real-world deployment

    How it relates to CAIN-42: An agent being able to start a payment is different from holding authority to make it. That is the capability-versus-authority distinction applied to money.

    What it explains, how CAIN applies it, and what it does not prove
    What the source explains
    Per the publisher's description: as agents search, compare and transact for consumers, trust has to come first. Consumers need confidence the agent stays within their instructions; merchants and issuers need visibility into intent, identity and authorization; consumer control is preserved through clear authorization and secure credential handling.
    How CAIN applies this principle
    CAIN-42 ships wallet-mandate and checkout-mandate review engines that check a supplied mandate record against published rules and sign the result. Implemented; public evidence limited
    What this does not prove
    CAIN-42 has no integration, approval or partnership with Visa, and its mandate engines review records; they do not process payments.
    CAIN evidence and documentation
    Agentic 75 product engines
  13. SOURCE 13 OF 13 · KEYNOTE HIGHLIGHTS

    Jensen Huang's Keynote Highlights at NVIDIA GTC Berlin 2026

    Jensen Huang, NVIDIA · published by NVIDIA · 2026-10-25

    • Commerce and real-world deployment
    • Swarms

    How it relates to CAIN-42: Execution governance is one component of a much larger agent stack that runs from chips to robots.

    What it explains, how CAIN applies it, and what it does not prove
    What the source explains
    Per the publisher's description: how AI factories are evolving to run agents and why physical AI is the next frontier, with announcements across AI infrastructure, safe agents, open models, enterprise AI, healthcare, mobility and robotics.
    How this informs CAIN's roadmap
    CAIN-42's physical-systems work is simulation only. No hardware is governed today, and physical deployment is on the roadmap. Planned
    What this does not prove
    A keynote vision does not establish CAIN-42's suitability for safety-critical physical deployment.
    CAIN evidence and documentation
    Agentic 75 governance map

What these sources do, and do not, establish

They do establish

  • That identity providers, gateway vendors, model developers, cloud platforms, payment networks and open-source foundations are publicly treating agent authorization, attribution, revocation and evidence as engineering requirements.
  • That separating the reasoning model from the place where actions execute is a mainstream design for long-running agents.
  • That swarms of specialized agents are a shipping pattern, which makes delegated authority a live problem.

They do not establish

  • That any of these organizations has reviewed, endorsed, partnered with or integrated CAIN-42.
  • That CAIN-42 was developed in response to these talks, or that CAIN-42 meets any vendor's stated performance.
  • That any system here has passed an independent audit or is safe for every deployment. Vendor presentations are not peer-reviewed research.

2027–2028 outlook: thousands of governed agents, with a kill switch

The goal FIRME AI CORPORATION is building CAIN-42 toward: thousands of specialized AI agents working for thousands of hours across many different fields, every action authorized before it runs, every result backed by evidence, and one kill switch that sits outside the model. Governed swarms of specialists, one vertical at a time, are our path to that.

This is a goal and an outlook, not a forecast presented as fact. If agents become more persistent, more interconnected and more economically consequential, their authority will need to remain explicit and enforceable throughout their operation. CAIN-42 is being developed around that requirement.

Where that path stands today, measured

  • 1,000 real worker processes on one host, each with its own signed identity, every result independently re-checked.
  • 1,018 aggregate worker-hours across concurrent workers. That is a sum over workers, not continuous elapsed runtime; the longest single continuous mission is one hour.
  • 12 fields in one mission, with every result re-checked by an agent from a different field. Those tasks were deterministic text operations, not model reasoning.
  • Fleet quarantine that stops further governed actions by one agent or a whole swarm. It stops what comes next; it cannot reverse what is already done.
  • Next: the same controls held across more hosts, multi-day missions and model-backed specialists.

CAIN-42 does not claim general intelligence, and nothing here predicts when or whether it arrives. The claim is narrower: whatever agents become capable of, their authority should be granted, bounded and revocable from outside the model.

CAIN evidence and documentation

Source review date: 2026-11-15. For each of the 13 sources the link, title, channel, publication date and publisher's description were checked on that date, and timestamps are the publisher's own chapter markers. Summaries restate the publisher's description; they are not transcripts or quotations. CAIN-42 evidence is produced and hosted by FIRME AI CORPORATION and has not been audited by a third party.

Agentic AI 75: use the engines developers can actually run

The Agentic 75 turns the 75 defining 2026 agentic-AI developments into fixed-scope CAIN-42 products, built one at a time. Pick a live engine below, run its honest sample or one of its failure cases, edit the record and run it again: the live route evaluates the product's published rules, the same file its offline verifier embeds. Products without an engine yet are labelled pilot, advisory or design; none is presented as a finished engine.

Use it now

  • The 75-product catalog — status, price, scope and exclusions on every page
  • The governance map — the authority, evidence and containment each 2026 development needs
  • Catalog JSON — machine-readable, for your own tooling
  • Try-it JSON API — POST /api/v1/agentic-products/<SKU>/review with {"record": {...}} or {"case": "<name>"}
  • Operator self-test: all 75 engine-backed SKUs run and verify their manifest before each release

What is verified today

  • 75/75 engine-backed SKUs produced a verified SHA-256 manifest on fixed samples
  • 75 unique SKUs; status counts add to 75
  • Three full sample deliveries are published with an offline verifier that imports no CAIN code
  • The manifest is unsigned: it detects a changed file, not who produced it
  • No customer run, partnership, certification or third-party audit is claimed
curl -s https://mcpgate.online/api/v1/agentic-products/CAIN-A75-045/review \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"case": "self_approved"}'

Open the 75 products See the product evidence on clawx.click Use it in the Hugging Face Space

Use the catalog to pick an engine and a scope. Use MCPGate below to enforce it at the tool boundary. Use clawx.click to check what was actually run.

AGENTIC 75: the top 75 agentic-AI developments of 2026, turned into CAIN-42 products one at a time. See which are live.

What MCPGate is

MCPGate is the enforcement boundary of CAIN-42, built for the Model Context Protocol. It's a JSON-RPC 2.0 proxy that speaks MCP on both sides, over stdio (Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, Cline, custom agents) and over HTTP/SSE (remote MCP servers). Your agent talks to MCPGate as if it were the MCP server, and MCPGate talks to the real server only for calls that are authorized.

It is

  • A gate on the execution channel, the tool calls, not the chat text
  • Default-deny: unknown tools, malformed requests and errors never become an allow. The SDK is default-deny too, and opting out is explicit and recorded.
  • Bound authorization: the authorization covers one exact call, expires, and is single-use (no replay, no swapping the tool or the arguments)
  • A guard stack on every call: data-exfiltration killswitch, skill scope, delegation (swarm collusion), memory firewall, supply chain
  • Evidence: every allow and every denial is signed and hash-chained, and you can verify it offline

It is not

  • A prompt filter or a chat moderation layer
  • An authorizer by consensus: the quorum commits and co-signs a decision, and it can never turn a denial into an allow
  • A guarantee for calls that bypass it: tools your agent reaches without MCPGate are not governed
  • A public download today: the self-hosted appliance is packaged, and access is on request (see below)
  • Partial hosted enforcement (2026-11-13): hosted /mcp calls to call_service now require an authenticated caller, pass the real MCPGate interceptor and an E8 single-use commit before the tool body. The other hosted tools remain under restriction-only guard stages; the full customer-call claim is still not made.

Where it fits

  ┌──────────────┐   tools/call    ┌───────────────────────────────┐   authorized only   ┌──────────────┐
  │  AI agent    │ ──────────────▶ │            MCPGate            │ ──────────────────▶ │  MCP server  │
  │ Claude, IDE, │ ◀────────────── │  guard stack · bound authz    │ ◀────────────────── │ tools · data │
  │ your agent   │  result / -32000│  signed evidence              │       result        │  APIs · DBs  │
  └──────────────┘                 └───────────────┬───────────────┘                     └──────────────┘
                                                   │ commit the exact call
                                         ┌─────────▼─────────┐
                                         │ CAIN-42 validator │  PBFT, N = 4, quorum 3
                                         │ quorum cain-mr-03 │  4 servers, 4 US regions
                                         └───────────────────┘  vendor-operated

The call path, step by step

  1. Intercept. The agent's tools/call reaches MCPGate, not the server. Requests that aren't valid JSON-RPC are refused with -32600.
  2. Canonicalize. The call becomes a canonical action: tool, arguments, scope, the agent's identity and its security context.
  3. Guard stack. Killswitch (bulk exfiltration), skill scope, delegation loops, forged memories, typosquatted packages. Any stage can stop the call.
  4. Authorize. The call runs only with a PBFT-committed authorization bound to that exact action, scope, identity, context and expiry. Its capability token is short-lived (the TTL is capped) and single-use.
  5. Forward or deny. Authorized calls are forwarded unchanged. Everything else returns -32000 with enforcement: BLOCKED_AT_BOUNDARY and an evidence hash.
  6. Evidence. The decision is signed and chained, so you can re-check it later without CAIN code.

Live playground

Every panel calls a live production route on this site. Nothing here is simulated in the browser.

Paste a tool definition (name, description, input_schema), or load a sample. The deterministic MCP security scanner looks for poisoned descriptions, hidden instructions, credential references and unbounded parameters. POST /mcpgate-keystone/scan-source

Quickstart

The hosted path works today: get a free API key (no card), then ask for a decision before your agent calls a tool. Run the tool only if the verdict is exactly ALLOWED.

curl
export CAIN_API_KEY=...        # from https://cainstudio.online/signup
curl -s https://mcpgate.online/fabric/decisions \
  -H "X-API-Key: $CAIN_API_KEY" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"agent_id": "billing-agent", "service": "payments", "path": "/tools/send_payment",
       "payload": {"to": "acct-991", "amount": 25000}}'
# => {"verdict": "ALLOWED" | "BLOCKED" | "REQUIRE_APPROVAL" | …, "decision_id": "fd_…", ...}
python
import os, requests

def guarded(tool, args, agent="billing-agent"):
    r = requests.post("https://mcpgate.online/fabric/decisions",
                      headers={"X-API-Key": os.environ["CAIN_API_KEY"]},
                      json={"agent_id": agent, "path": f"/tools/{tool}", "payload": args}, timeout=30)
    d = r.json()
    if d.get("verdict") != "ALLOWED":        # BLOCKED, REQUIRE_APPROVAL, *_DEGRADED, errors: do not run it
        raise PermissionError(f"{tool}: {d.get('verdict')} ({d.get('decision_id')})")
    return d["decision_id"]                  # keep it: the signed record is your evidence

decision = guarded("send_payment", {"to": "acct-991", "amount": 25000})
typescript (node 18+, fetch)
export async function guarded(tool: string, args: Record<string, unknown>, agent = "billing-agent") {
  const r = await fetch("https://mcpgate.online/fabric/decisions", {
    method: "POST",
    headers: { "X-API-Key": process.env.CAIN_API_KEY!, "Content-Type": "application/json" },
    body: JSON.stringify({ agent_id: agent, path: `/tools/${tool}`, payload: args }),
  });
  const d = await r.json();
  if (d.verdict !== "ALLOWED") throw new Error(`${tool}: ${d.verdict} (${d.decision_id})`);   // fail closed
  return d.decision_id as string;
}
go (net/http)
func Guarded(tool string, args map[string]any) (string, error) {
	body, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{"agent_id": "billing-agent", "path": "/tools/" + tool, "payload": args})
	req, _ := http.NewRequest("POST", "https://mcpgate.online/fabric/decisions", bytes.NewReader(body))
	req.Header.Set("X-API-Key", os.Getenv("CAIN_API_KEY"))
	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
	resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
	if err != nil { return "", err }                      // network error: do not run the tool
	defer resp.Body.Close()
	var d map[string]any
	if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&d); err != nil { return "", err }
	verdict, _ := d["verdict"].(string)
	id, _ := d["decision_id"].(string)
	if verdict != "ALLOWED" { return id, fmt.Errorf("%s: %s", tool, verdict) }   // fail closed
	return id, nil
}
verify your records later
curl -s https://mcpgate.online/fabric/decisions/$DECISION_ID/signed-record -H "X-API-Key: $CAIN_API_KEY" > record.json
curl -s https://mcpgate.online/fabric/decision-signing-key > key.json
curl -sO https://clawx.click/evidence/decision-signing-2026-09-27/verify_decision_record.py.txt
python3 verify_decision_record.py.txt record.json --key key.json      # ENCODING / DIGEST / KEY / SIGNATURE

Every customer can also verify all of their agents' records in the browser at clawx.click → Verify your own evidence.

MCPGate Connect: guard any MCP server today (open source)

MCPGate Connect wraps any stdio MCP server. Every tools/call your client sends is decided first by the hosted decision API with your key, and it reaches the server only on exactly ALLOWED. Anything else, including a timeout, a network error or a missing key, returns -32000 BLOCKED_AT_BOUNDARY. All other MCP messages pass through unchanged. It's one file, uses only the Python standard library, and is Apache-2.0.

install and run
pip install https://cainstudio.online/open-source/mcpgate_connect-0.1.0-py3-none-any.whl
export CAIN_API_KEY=...        # free: https://cainstudio.online/signup
mcpgate-connect --agent my-agent -- npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem ~/projects
Claude Desktop / Cursor: mcpServers entry
{"mcpServers": {"files-guarded": {
  "command": "mcpgate-connect",
  "args": ["--agent", "desktop-agent", "--", "npx", "-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem", "/Users/me/projects"],
  "env": {"CAIN_API_KEY": "..."}}}}

Check what you install

The wheel, source zip and tar.gz are listed in the signed SHA256SUMS (Ed25519, signature). Run python3 verify_release.py from cainstudio.online/open-source to check every download.

Source: mcpgate-connect-0.1.0.zip · .tar.gz

Connect vs the appliance

With Connect, the decision is made by the hosted CAIN-42 trust fabric and recorded as a signed record for your tenant (verify yours). The self-hosted appliance also binds a quorum-committed, single-use capability token to the call at your server. Hosted call_service now gets an E8 single-use commit, not a quorum-committed capability; Connect still does not bind one.

API reference (live routes)

Method & pathAuthWhat it does
POST /fabric/decisionsAPI keyDecide one intended tool call before it runs: verdict, stages, signed record
GET /fabric/decisions?limit&cursor&agent_idAPI keyYour decisions, newest first, cursor-paged; filter by agent
GET /fabric/agents/summaryAPI keyEvery agent in your tenant: decision counts by verdict, first and last seen
GET /fabric/decisions/{id}/signed-recordAPI keyThe record exactly as stored and signed, as input to the offline verifier
GET /fabric/decision-signing-keynoneThe Ed25519 key that signs every decision record
POST /fabric/mcp/enforceAPI key + signed agent manifestThe MCPGate enforce endpoint: refuses any tenant without a registered, governance-signed system manifest and any request not signed by the agent's key
POST /fabric/try?scenario=noneA real decision on a throwaway tenant (demo); GET /fabric/try lists scenarios
POST /mcpgate-keystone/scan-sourcenoneDeterministic security scan of one MCP tool definition
GET /api/v1/mcpgate/guard-stack/presets · POST …/runnoneRun agent call sequences through the guard-stack stage code
GET /api/v1/live-cluster/health?cluster=noneValidator cluster health (reported by the gateway)
GET /api/v1/live-cluster/qc/{seq}?cluster=noneCOMMIT and PREPARE quorum certificates for one sequence
GET /.well-known/cain-keys.jsonnonePublished validator member keys

Interactive reference: /docs. Machine-readable index for auditors and AI reviewers: clawx.click/auditor.json.

Self-hosted appliance

MCPGate is designed to run inside your network, next to your MCP servers, so tool traffic and evidence stay on your infrastructure. It ships as a Helm chart that runs the gateway and the MCP proxy as a fail-closed deployment.

values.yaml (excerpt from the chart in the CAIN repository)
replicaCount: 2
security:
  failClosed: true
  enforceZeroTrustFloor: true
  airGapped: false
service:
  gatewayPort: 8000
  mcpProxyPort: 8421
  metricsPort: 9090

Availability today

The appliance is a packaged Helm chart. No public self-hosted installer is published, and the chart, image and proxy source are not public downloads. Design partners get access on request.

Request appliance access

Free and open source today: MCPGate Connect, FALSEWORK, PROOFLOOP and their verifiers (Apache-2.0) at cainstudio.online/open-source.

Status & limits, read live from the signed register

Statuses and limits below come from the Ed25519-signed claims register and are not typed into this page.

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One system, three sites

Integrations

Keep your control plane. Add the receipt.

CAIN-42 plugs into the consoles you already own. Splunk, Prisma, Zenity and Microsoft keep the control plane; CAIN supplies the signed, offline-verifiable record their dashboards cannot hand an auditor.

Splunk / CiscoHEC, CEF, LEEF. Lands in the SOC.
Palo Alto Prisma AIRSCEF + a customer-side envelope.
ZenityA proof envelope for agent governance.
Microsoft Sentinel / EntraLog Analytics JSON; join Entra logs.

Connectors · Proof Standard · Pricing and Proof SLA · Evidence bundle

Put down the pisto, follow Jesucristo.